International/IAP
National Implementation Effor
Review Conference Documents 

Chemical Industry Issues

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The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the development, production, acquisition, retention, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Unprecedented in its scope and complexity, the Convention seeks not only to ban chemical weapons, but to monitor the production, consumption, processing, import and export of specific chemicals identified as either scheduled chemicals or unscheduled discrete organic chemicals.

Many of the scheduled chemicals monitored by the Convention are dual-use, meaning that in addition to being used as chemical weapons or precursors to chemical weapons, they have important and legitimate commercial uses. As a result of this broad scope, the CWC is the first arms control agreement to impact more commercial facilities than government or military installations.

The challenge of verification, therefore, is to comprehensively, efficiently, and effectively monitor the peaceful use of chemicals while remaining balanced against undue intrusion and burden upon chemical industry. It is the task of States Parties to achieve this balance through their active participation as both managers of the OPCW and subjects of OPCW verification. At the first Review Conference (RevCon), it is our responsibility as CWC States Parties to review and evaluate the implementation of the Convention and provide guidance for future activities. States Parties' RevCon efforts should be guided by three objectives: accountability, consistency, and effectiveness/efficiency.

Accountability is simply holding both States Parties and the OPCW Technical Secretariat responsible for fully meeting obligations under the Convention or decisions of the OPCW.

Consistency means a fair approach, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, that imposes equivalent requirements on all States Parties. In terms of declarations, this means clarifying declaration rules to standardize, where possible, what States Parties declare. In terms of inspections, it means imposing equitable scrutiny regardless of the site or State Party. Consistency is not necessarily the same as predictability.

Effectiveness/Efficiency: Ultimately, the provisions of Article VI of the CWC were established to detect or deter possible violations of the CWC's nonproliferation and disarmament undertakings. If the verification regime is not effective in doing so, Article VI inspections become a fruitless exercise at the expense of chemical industry.

Any decisions adopted by the OPCW related to the Article VI regime should consider: a) whether the decision will increase or decrease the ability to detect or deter violations, and to what degree; and b) the cost and other implications for the organization, affected facilities, and States Parties.

The verification regime set forth in the Convention is sound in principle. There remain, however, numerous details of implementation pertaining to Article VI activities that require attention. To date, it has taken the Executive Council far too long to develop and adopt decisions on industry issues. Prioritization and resolution of industry issues satisfactorily and promptly is essential to ensuring an even-handed and effective system of verification.

The United States believes the objective of this working group should be to: 1) establish broad guidelines and objectives to assist States Parties in preparing for the RevCon, 2) identify issues for RevCon consideration, 3) prioritize consideration of these issues. The goal of these discussions should be to lay the foundation for the development of a work plan for the Organization.

The United States offers the following comments to facilitate discussion, with respect to the industry implementation issues outlined in the coordinator's paper, dated 14 October 2002:

Article VI Declarations

The Review Conference should stress the need for further work to standardize and clarify the declaration process within a stated time frame. Despite progress, there are still significant inconsistencies in the practice of States Parties over how and what to declare (e.g., gaps in verification created by treaty deadlines for annual declarations of anticipated activities, "nil" declarations, rounding rules, criteria for submitting amendments, determining declarability based on aggregation of activities, standardization of territorial, possession or commonwealth identifications). As a separate but related issue, the continued absence of implementing legislation and other national implementation measures in some States Parties and the lack of reporting on these measures by a majority of States Parties raise concerns about the completeness of declarations.

Article VI Inspection Procedures

The Review Conference should call for further refinement of inspection procedures with a view to improving the consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness of inspections. In particular there is a need to achieve a clear, effective, and commonly understood approach to addressing the absence of Schedule 1 chemicals, particularly their production, at Schedule 2, 3, and UDOC plant sites, and for further work on a practical, balanced approach, consistent with the Convention, to sampling and analysis procedures during inspections.

Implementation of Transfers Prohibitions

The Review Conference should urge States Parties that have not yet implemented transfer prohibitions to take effective steps to do so. The Convention prohibits the transfer of Schedule 1 or 2 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC, as well as the retransfer of Schedule 1 chemicals to a third state. There is, in addition, the more general Article I obligation not to assist anyone to engage in a prohibited activity, which must be taken into account when transferring chemicals-or associated technology-to any entity.

Schedule 3 Transfers to Non-States Parties

The working group should evaluate the effectiveness of the existing end-use certificate requirement. Depending upon the results of that study, recommendations concerning potential "other measures," taking into account their potential nonproliferation benefits, impact on universality, and economic consequences may or may not be warranted.

Impact of Developments in Science and Technology

Pertaining to the Article VIII, paragraph 22 requirement for the RevCon to take into account scientific and technological developments in reviewing the operation of the Convention, the Review Conference should: 1) acknowledge that both the chemical industry and the chemical weapons threat are subject to change over time, and 2) affirm the need for an evolutionary approach to Article VI verification that can respond to such changes.

Confidentiality

The United States considers this a broader issue, best dealt with in its own right, rather than under the heading of Chemical Industry issues.

In addition to those subjects raised in the Coordinator's paper, the United States believes there are other issues that are appropriate for consideration:

Allocation of Inspection Effort

The RevCon should urge the rapid adoption of appropriate decisions on the implementation of Section B of Part IX of the Verification Annex to guide site selection for DOC/PSF inspections. Inspections under Article VI are an important verification tool to enhance confidence among States Parties. Broad geographic distribution of inspections is thus essential. At the same time, attention must be paid to the distribution of inspections among the various groups of Article VI facilities -- Schedule 1, Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and DOC/PSF plant sites - in order to ensure adequate inspection intensity for each grouping. Within each grouping, however, flexibility must be maintained to react to the risk assessment or relevant information available concerning each individual plant site. The Review Conference should affirm the importance of a wide global distribution of inspections, as well as the need to ensure adequate inspection intensity for each category of facility under Article VI.

Compliance With Article VI

The CWC's provisions for declaration and inspection of industry are among the most extensive and complex ever concluded. As a result, the effective implementation vital to the success of the Convention poses many challenges for any State Party. The Review Conference should urge States Parties to provide information on their efforts to put in place and carry out effective implementing measures. The RevCon should also urge States Parties to identify difficulties encountered in carrying out their obligations under Article VII. The Technical Secretariat and States Parties in a position to do so should be encouraged to provide any appropriate encouragement and assistance before considering measures under Article XII. The United States believes that the vast majority of States Parties wish to fully comply with the Convention and the United States is prepared, in coordination with the OPCW, to assist States Parties with their implementing measures.

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